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Stdphane Beaulac*

The Myth of Jus Tractatus in La Belle
Province: Quebec's G~rin-Lajoie
Statement

There is much debate in Quebec challenging the traditional stance on jus
tractatus," prevalent for nearly 100 years, to the effect that the federal government
enjoys plenary power to enter into international treaties, whether the subject matter
is federal or provincial. The paper argues that Quebec's Gdrin-Lajoie "doctrine"
has become a myth over the years, liable to have a huge semiotic effect, creating
the perception that there is an incontestably true legal basis for provincial treatymaking power After dwelling upon the ontological understanding of mythology,
the author shows that the constitutional practice since the emancipation from
Great Britain, as well as uninterrupted caselaw since both decisions in the Labour
Conventions Case, inexorably support the exclusive federal power based on
royal prerogatives, a position confirmed de jure with the 1947 Letters Patent. The
Gdrin-Lajoie statement is just that, a political statement, which is unsubstantiated
by positive rules of constitutional law; the "two-Crown approach," based on
Liquidators of Maritime Bank and Bonanza Creek, is of no avail in that regard.
/ y a bien du bruit, au Qubbec, contestant l'6tat du droit relatif au <<jus tractatus,>>
pourtant fixd depuis prbs de cent ans, voulant que le gouvernement f6deral
d6tienne la plenitude des pouvoirs pour conclure les traitbs internationaux, que
la matibre relbve du f~d6ral ou du provincial. L'auteur est d'avis que la <doctrine.>
Gdrin-Lajoie du Quebec est devenue un mythe, dont Ieffet s6miologique est
6norme, crdant une perception incontestable qu'un jus tractatus provincial jouit
d'une base juridique v~ritable. Aprbs avoir discut6 de l'apprdhension ontologique
de la mythologie, il est vu que la pratique constitutionnelle depuis l'emancipation
de la Grande Bretagne, ainsi que la jurisprudence ininterrompue depuis les deux
d~cisions dans /Affaire des Conventions du travail, vont inexorablement dans le
sens d'un pouvoir exclusif f~ddral fond6 sur les prdrogatives royales, une position
confirmde de jure avec les Lettres patentes de 1947. L'dnonc6 Gdrin-Lajoie
n'est que ga en fait, un 6nonc6 politique, qui ne s'appuie sur aucune ragle de
droit constitutionnel positif; la th6orie des <deux Couronnes,>> venant des arr~ts
Liquidateurs de la Banque maritime et Bonanza Creek, s'avlre inutile a ce sujet.
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Introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein was certainly right, dare I say presumptuously, to
recant his original position expressed in Tractatus'-to the effect that
words represent reality, that language offers, as it were, a mere picture
of the world-and (finally) realise that words and expressions do not
only provide a representation of reality but, indeed, that language is an
activity happening within reality, that in effect language is a participant in
human consciousness. 2 Fellow University of Cambridge international law
professor Philip Allott has also borrowed from Wittgenstein:
With Wittgenstein, we have been forced to face the possibility that human
communication is not the transfer of something called Truth through a
neutral medium called Language. Communication would then have to
be regarded as simply another form of human activity, sharing in the
intrinsic and irreducible ambiguity of all human activity.'
This fundamental theory of language, which in a way has proved
revolutionary in modem philosophy, is at the centre of this short paper
honouring Hugh Kindred. Along with his legacy of scholarship in this field
of studies, in the steps of his predecessors at Dalhousie like Ronald St.
John Macdonald, this great international legal commentator has allowed
a whole generation of new authors like myself to feel confident enough
and recognised enough by senior peers to say outrageous things like
"Wittgenstein was certainly right"! No doubt, believing in one's intellect
1. L Wittgenstein, TractatusLogico-Philosophicus(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961) at 15
etseq & 51 etseq.
2.
See his posthumous work gathered from his former students, L Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958) at I if.
3.
P Allott, "The Nation as Mind Politic" (1992) 24 J Int'l L & Pol 1361 at 1361-1362.

The Myth of Jus Tractatus in La Belle Province:
Quebec's G6rin-Lajoie Statement

239

is essential to take stands that are, perhaps at times, unpopular and to play
the role expected from academics, namely to provide a poised view on
complex questions and thus shed a different perspective on debates in our
societies, among other things.
Independent legal scholarship, true and bold, surely needs a dose
of audacity, when going against the tide seems all but opportunisticthe darkness of dogmatism being never far in our profession-but I
have taken comfort from acknowledgement and appreciation of some
iminences grises, who not necessarily agree, but unconditionally accept
different points of view, even on difficult (and politically charged)
subjects. Professor Kindred is one of those quiet forces and wise men in
Canada's international law, whose active leadership-interalia, via his
celebrated casebook-is only matched by his sense of collegiality and his
effort to value other people's perspectives. I happened to be directly on the
receiving end of such generosity on more than one occasion, be it in regard
to a participation in a roundtable of experts in international law (only
in my second year of teaching law at the University of Montreal)' or in
relation to the non-internationalist sovereignty-oriented approach' I have
been defending on issues of interlegality and the domestic reception of

4.
1 am referring here to my participation, on the theme of the history and theory of international
law, in the workshop entitled "Expert Roundtable on International Norms and Law," organised by the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, in collaboration with the Munk
Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, on 1April 2003.
5.
See, among my many papers on the subject, S Beaulac, "National Application of International
Law: The Statutory Interpretation Perspective" (2003) 41 Can YB Int'l Law 225; S Beaulac, "Recent
Developments on the Role of International Law in Canadian Statutory Interpretation" (2004) 25
Stat L Rev 19; S Beaulac, "Arr6tons de dire que les tribunaux au Canada sont 'li6s' par le droit
international" (2004) 38 RJT 359; S Beaulac, "L'interpr6tation de la Charte : reconsideration de
l'approche t6l6ologique et r66valuation du r6le du droit international" in G-A Beaudoin & E Mendes,
eds, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005)
27, reprinted in (2005) 27 SCLR (2d) 1; S Beaulac, "Customary International Law in Domestic Courts:
Imbroglio, Lord Denning, Stare Decisis" in CPM Waters, ed, British and Canadian Perspectives on
International Law (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhof, 2006) 379; S Beaulac, "Thinking Outside the
'Westphalian Box': Dualism, Legal Interpretation and the Contextual Argument" in CC Eriksen &
M Emberland, eds, The New International Law-An Anthology (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,
2010) 17.
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international normativity 6 (in spite of the efforts by some other colleagues
to discredit my positions' or to simply ignore my contributions').
This paper is likely to be another one that will not be well received
by many of my contemporaries, especially in la belle province. I feel
safe, however, taking this stand in a volume that is dedicated to Professor
Kindred, as I assume his trademark open-mindedness to different ideas
will be contagious with the readership. Unfortunately, la pense unique
is all too prominent in many circles-geographically, perhaps more so in
Quebec-and, in an industry like academia, must be denounced for what
it is: a form of intellectual bullying. It is in this context and against the
provocative background of epistemological pluralism that I will address
issues ofjus tractatus(i.e., the capacity to enter into treaties) in international
law, as regards the situation in the sovereign nation-state of Canada, as
well as the recent claims in one of its federated sub-states, the province of
Quebec, often put in terms of the Gdrin-Lajoie statement. The latter is a
political position expressed by then Quebec Minister of Education, Paul
Gdrin-Lajoie, in the mid- 1960s to the effect that Canadian provinces (and
in particular Quebec) ought to have the power to conclude international
treaties on subject-matters falling under their legislative authorities,
pursuant to section 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.10
The hypothesis of this paper, simply put, is that there is absolutely
no foundation in law to such claims. Both public international law and,
especially, Canadian public law clearly support the traditional position
that the federal government in this country has the plenary powers when it
comes to concluding binding conventions on the international plane. Legal
actors in the province of Quebec know this and, indeed, know that the law

6. An unpopular stand, especially within Canada's international legal community, which did not
stop Hugh from having me participate in a Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of
Canada event, in collaboration with McGill Law School, on issues of interlegality and the national use
of international law in Canada. The outcome of the two-day conference, held in Montreal on 15-16
June 2005, is the collective book OE Fitzgerald et al, eds, The Globalized Rule ofLaw-Relationships
between International and Domestic Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) in which I published a paper
entitled "International Law and Statutory Interpretation: Up with Context, Down with Presumption"
at 331, also available in French, S Beaulac, "Le droit international et l'interpr6tation 16gislative: oui au
contexte, non Ala pr6somption" in OE Fitzgerald et al, eds, Regle de droit et mondialisation: rapports
entre le droit international et le droit interne (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2006) 413.
7.
See, for instance, C-E C6t, "La riception du droit international en droit canadien" (2010) 52
SCLR (2d) 483.
8.
See, for instance, A de Mestral & E Fox-Decent, "Rethinking the Relationship Between
International and Domestic Law" (2008) 53 McGill LJ 573.
9.
See also P Gdrin-Lajoie, "Le Quebec est vraiment un Etat mme s'il n'a pas la souverainetd
entibre," Le Devoir (14 avril 1965) 5; and P Gdrin-Lajoie, "I1nous faut une plus large autonomie et le
droit de n6gocier avec l'6tranger," Le Devoir (15 avril 1965) 5.
10. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, C 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
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has been settled for almost a century in that sense. But starting in the mid1960s and with more intensity in the last fifteen years, there seem to have
been increasing attempts at putting this well-entrenched legal principle
into doubt. Indeed, there are different actors, including some in academia,
that have participated in creating the impression that, in fact, the federal
plenary power over jus tractatus may be put into question, that it would
be contended and unsettled. What this paper seeks to show is that there
is a constructed meaning around the G6rin-Lajoie statement and that it
is tantamount to a myth in the public law of this province, one that is (by
definition) unfounded in hard positive law. In the next section (Part I) I
shall briefly dwell upon the learned ontological understanding of myth
and mythology, and then (in Part II) I will return to the state of the law on
jus tractatus.
I. The power of mythology and socially constructedmyths"
Words and expressions are activities in themselves.12 Words and expressions
are mental-social phenomena separate and distinct from reality." Words
and expressions exist and act within human consciousness. 4 Like ordinary
words, myths are also powerful social productions, often (though not
necessarily) themselves expressed through language, which provide a
shared explanatory structure for substantial areas of socially constructed
reality. In the last century and a half, myths and mythology have been the
subject of numerous scholarly works in different disciplines," not only

11. This section borrows from my book, S Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of
InternationalLaw- The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia (Leiden &
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) ch 2.
12. For more on this, see JL Austin's "speech-act theory" in How to do Things with Words (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1962).
13. Such a conceptualisation of words and expressions as separate and distinct from reality, is
essentially nominalist-etymologically,belonging to a name. Nominalism is a medieval philosophy,
most often associated with William of Ockham, which took the view that abstract concepts are merely
words and do not refer to anything that exists in the way that particular things exist.
14. This idea of "consciousness of humanity" is borrowed from the moral philosophy of Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in particular from Phdnomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952)
632-671; see also GWF Hegel, PhenomenologyofSpirit, translated by AV Miller (Oxford: Clarendon,
1977) 383-409.
15. See MI Steblin-Kamenskij, Myth (Ann Arbor: Karoma, 1982) at 21; and J Waardenburg,
"Symbolic Aspects of Myth" in AM Olson, ed, Myth, Symbol, and Reality (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1980) 41 at 60-61.
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theology and philosophy, but also psychology, anthropology, semantics,
literary criticism, sociology, and political science.' 6
The term "mythology" (from "mthologia") combines the Greek
"mfithos" and "l6gos," both of which originally referred to the ideas of
"speech" and "story."" In its earliest sense, mithos was the thing spoken,
uttered by the mouth.'" Only later did it come to connote "speech" and,
with Herodotus in the 5th century BCE, mfithos was relegated to fictitious
narrative." For its part, I6gos (relating to "ligein") denotes demonstrable
facts, formal conceptualisation, the rational explanation of things.20 When
Idgos evolved to the sense of logical reasoning, however, mfithos became
somewhat problematic-"Mythos came to be seen not as a relevant
presentation of the world but as simply a story which has an emotional
effect on listeners and thus not a decisive account (logos)."2'
This dichotomy between mfithos as story-telling and fiction, on the
one hand, and l6gos as rational explanation, on the other, remains relevant
today and explains that, in everyday usage, a myth is often taken to

16. See, for instance, FWJ von Schelling, Philosophie der Mythologie (Stuttgart & Augsburg: no
publisher, 1857); FM Miller, "On the Philosophy of Mythology" in FM Miller, Introduction to the
Science ofReligion (London: Longmans, Green, 1873) 335; JG Frazer, The Golden Bough-A Study
in Comparative Religion, 2 (London: Macmillan, 1890); S Freud, Die Traumdeutung (Leipzig &
Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1900); t Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life-A Study
in Religious Sociology (London: Allen & Unwin, 1915); JE Harrison, Mythology (London: Harrap,
1925); B Malinowski, Myth in Primitive Psychology (London: Kegan Paul, 1926); E Cassirer,
Language and Myth (New York: Harper, 1946); AW Watts, Myth and Ritual in Christianity (London
& New York: Thames & Hudson, 1953); C Levi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale (Paris: Plon, 1958)
227; CG Jung, Man and His Symbols (London: Aldus Books, 1964); P Ricoeur, The Symbolism of
Evil (Boston: Beacon, 1969); J Campbell, The Masks of God: Creative Mythology (London: Souvenir
Press, 1974); I Strenski, Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth Century History-Cassirer Eliade, LiviStrauss and Malinowski (London: Macmillan, 1987); and P Hegy, Myth as Foundation for Society and
Values-A Sociological Analysis (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991).
17. See, generally, H Levin, "Some Meanings of Myth" in HA Murray, ed, Myth and Mythmaking
(New York: Braziller, 1960) 103.
18. See P Stambovsky, Myth and the Limits of Reason (Amsterdam & Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996) at 32;
and TF Hoad, ed, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986) at 307.
19. See J-P Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (Brighton: Harvester, 1980) at 186 et seq.
20. See JAK Thomson, The Art of the Logos (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935) at 17-19; Stambovsky,
supra, note 18 at 33-34; and Hoad, supra, note 18 at 270.
21. LJ Hatab, Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1990) at
334, note 30. See also WG Doty, Mythography-The Study of Myths and Rituals (Tuscaloosa, AL:
University of Alabama Press, 1986) at 3, who wrote that "logos gained the sense of referring to those
words making up doctrine or theory, as opposed to mythos for those words having an ornamental or
fictional, narrative function. The outcome of this development was that the mythological came to be
contrasted with logic (the logos-ical) and later with 'history' in the sense of an overview or chronicle
of events."
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involve an imagined, untrue account. 2 2 Works on myth, thus, invariably
contain the caveat according to which one must not confuse the popular,
pejorative sense of the term "myth" as a synonym for metaphor, falsehood,
and distortion, with the scholarly and learned sense which considers myths
as valid and true within the shared consciousness of a society.23 Similarly,
it is the allegorical value and the semiotic significance of myths that will
prove useful, in the next section, to analyse the G6rin-Lajoie statement.24
Myths may be put into five categories, based on their narrative line,
although any such attempt is somewhat challengeable as the classes are
not mutually exclusive and the borders between them remain vague. They
are: (i) aetiological myths, on the origin of things; (ii) eschatological
myths, about the final end of things; (iii) soteriological myths, pertaining
to momentous saving and salvation; (iv) ritual myths, combining rites
with narratives; and, (v) heroic myths, on accounts of glorious deeds and
accomplishments. 25 Preliminarily, let me suggest that the G6rin-Lajoie
statement-which will be demonstrated as mythical in the next sectionseems to have features of both soteriological myth and heroic myth, as
this political stand by the province of Quebec has come to represent a
necessary element for the preservation of its distinct character within the
Canadian federation, as well as an event personified by one prominent
MNA who bravely defended a basis for decentralisedjus tractatus.
Questions of myth and mythology were explored by Roland Barthes
in an essay entitled "Le mythe, aujourd'hui," 26 a final piece in a collection

22. See CG Flood, Political Myth (New York & London: Garland, 1996) at 6. See also Vemant,
supra note 19 at 186, who wrote: "The concept of myth we have inherited from the Greeks belongs, by
reason of its origins and history, to a tradition of thought peculiar to Western civilisation in which myth
is defined in terms of what is not myth, being opposed first to reality (myth is fiction) and, secondly, to
what is rational (myth is absurd)."
23. For instance, see E Leach, Levi-Strauss (London: Fontana/Collins, 1970) at 54, who explained
that "the special quality of myth is not that it is false but that it is divinely true for those who believe,
but fairy-tale for those who do not." See also, A Dundes, "Introduction" in A Dundes, ed, Sacred
Narrative-Readings in the Theory of Myth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 1 at 1;
and Doty, supra note 21 at 7-8.
24. See E Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946) at 45, who
makes the point as follows: "Myth is not only far remote from this empirical reality; it is, in a sense,
in flagrant contradiction to it. It seems to build up an entirely fantastic world. Nevertheless even
myth has a certain 'objective' aspect and a definite objective function. Linguistic symbolism leads to
an objectification of sense-impressions; mythical symbolism leads to an objectification offeelings"
[emphasis added].
25. See MS Day, The Many Meanings ofMyth (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984) at
21-27.
26. R Barthes, "Le mythe, aujourd'hui" in R Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Iditions du Seuil, 1957)
213; or see also the translation, R Barthes, "Myth Today" in R Barthes, Mythologies (London: Vintage,
1972) 109 [Barthes, "Myth"].
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of mythical stories written for Les lettres nouvelles.27 Following Swiss
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure's semiotic approach to language and other
sign-systems, 28 the French philosopher opined that, "myth is a type of
speech."29 Mythology would be a sign-system and would consist of the
relation between a "signifier" (image or pattern) and a "signified" (concept
or mental representation).3 0 In essence, therefore, mythology constitutes
a form of communication, similar to language and other systems of
signs. However, unlike other sign-systems, myths would involve not
a direct system of representation, but one of a second-order.' Indeed,
Barthes wrote that "myth is a peculiar system, in that it is constructed
from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second-order
semiological system."32 The original system of signs (linguistic or else)
would thus metamorphose into a mythical sign-system. It is in that context
that Lvi-Strauss noted that myth, "is both the same thing as language,
and also something different from it." 3 Thus, the sign consisting of a
signifier and a signified in the original representative order would become
the signifier in the second order of representation, and then be combined
with a signified to constitute a mythical sign. "[T]he materials of mythical
speech," Barthes wrote, "are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon
as they are caught by myth."34
Taking Barthes' example of the myth according to which "wrestling" is
a spectacle not a sport, 35 semiotics will of course be interested in the relation
between the image conveyed and the corresponding concept. However, the
inquiry will not concern the actual mental process of combining the word
"wrestling" as an image (i.e., signifier) with the mental representation of
a physical activity involving bodily contact (i.e., signified). Rather, the
analysis will focus on the second-order of representation attached to the
image-which is the myth of "wrestling," not the word any longer-that

27. Les lettres nouvelles was a highly respected French literary periodical published in France
(Paris) from 1953 to 1977, by Editions Julliard and later Editions Denoel.
28. See C Bally & A Sechehaye, eds, Ferdinand de Saussure-Cours de linguistiquegindrale (Paris:
Payot, 1916) [Saussure, Cours]; see also the translation by R Baskin, Course in GeneralLinguistics
(London: Peter Owen, 1960) [Saussure, Course]. The manuscript is entirely based on the lectures on
general linguistics given between 1907 and 1911 at the University of Geneva, which were edited and
published by de Saussure's students and colleagues after his death in 1913.
29. Barthes, "Myth," supra note 26 at 109 [emphasis in original].
30. Saussure, Cours,supra note 28 at 65 et seq and also Saussure, Course,supranote 28 at 99 et seq.
31. See J Culler, Barthes(London: Fontana, 1990) at 35.
32. Barthes, "Myth," supranote 26 at 114 [emphasis in original].
33. S Ldvi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972) at 209. See also the
original, C Ldvi-Strauss, Anthropologiestructurale,supra note 16 at 230.
34. Barthes, "Myth," supranote 26 at 114.
35. Ibidat 15 et seq.
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brings up the concept that "wrestling" is an entertaining show and not a
real sport.
Considering Barthes, and also Lvi-Strauss, it is most illuminating to
see what they reckon is the function of mythology in humanity. According
to Barthes, "myth has the task of giving an historical intention a natural
justification, and making contingency appear eternal." 6 Later, he noted:
What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if
this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or
used it; and what myth gives in return is a naturalimage of this reality."
Similarly, before illustrating his point using the French Revolution as a
forceful example, Lvi-Strauss instructed thus:
On the one hand, a myth always refers to events alleged to have taken
place long ago. But what gives the myth an operational value is that the
specific pattern described is timeless; it explains the present and the past
as well as the future.38
Indeed, in representing/creating mythical reality, a myth is generally
viewed as being at least somewhat linked to material reality found in
history, which the initial sign (linguistic or else) originally represented/
created through the human mind. As both Barthes and Ldvi-Strauss
pointed out, however, the most important feature in myth is that a degree
of certainty, eternity, and even orthodoxy, is invented and attributed to
these historical events in the process whereby the initial sign is deemed
a mythical sign and, consequently, whereby material reality changes into
mythology through the cognitive process of the mind."
The problem is that such historical facts may be unsettled and, in
effect, can be the subject of great controversies, which a myth will hide
and conceal.4 0 As such, a myth may carry great power in society, one that
is much more extraordinary than that of ordinary words and expressions.41
36. lbid at 142.
37. Ibid at 142 [emphasis in original].
38. Ldvi-Strauss, StructuralAnthropology, supra note 33 at 209. See also the original Ldvis-Strauss,
Anthropologie structurale,supra note 16 at 23 1.
39. It follows also that myths can be linked to the idea of fallacies, developed by Jeremy Bentham;
see HA Larrabee, ed, Bentham s Handbook of PoliticalFallacies(New York: Harper Brothers, 1962)
at 3, which reads: "By the name of fallacy it is common to designate any argument employed or topic
suggested for the purpose, or with the probability of producing the effect of deception, or of causing
some erroneous opinion to be entertained by any person to whose mind such an argument may have
been presented."
40. See Waardenburg, supranote 15 at 57, who wrote: "Myth then no longer gives access to reality
but rather keeps us away from it."
41. See Mtiller, supra note 16 at 355: "Mythology, in the highest sense, is the power exercised by
languageon thought in every possible sphere of mental activity" [emphasis added].
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Indeed, when a myth transforms material reality into mythical reality
through the human mind, or vice versa, when mythical reality causes a
word to transform into a myth through this cognitive process, the equivocal
character of the factual basis that may exist in material reality vanishes
because such historical foundations in mythical reality are no longer
considered relevant or are more or less viewed as incontestable.
In a way, a myth triggers reality to become larger than life. Material
reality expressed in terms of l6gos (logical reasoning) becomes
mythical reality expressed in mfdthos terms (fictitious narrative), but it
is nonetheless still considered by people in society in terms of Idgos, as
simply representing/creating reality, full stop. Put another way, the l6gos
that became a mfithos reverted back to being viewed as l6gos, that is, to
being a rational explanation of the matter at hand based, this time, on
a belief-system that unquestionably holds as valid and true the relevant
historical accounts. Consciously or not, we thus cease to care about the
material facts. As a result, the power that a word carries is increased
tenfold when it becomes a myth which, in turn, may be strategically used
to have considerable social impact upon human consciousness.
II. The myth of the Girin-Lajoiestatement
The Gdrin-Lajoie statement, as the soteriological/heroic myth it has
become over the years, is liable to have a huge social effect, as a perceived
incontestably true legal basis for jus tractatus in the province of Quebec.
In examining this myth, the historical facts, as well as the political and
legal context, which the linguistic sign originally represented/created
before it became a mythical sign, must be scrutinised to show that the
mythical reality for which it now stands is substantially remote from
the initial material reality. For this demonstration, the existing rules in
Canada's public law during the relevant time will be examined in some
detail, before considering the actual tenets of Minister Paul Grin-Lajoie's
political statement in the mid-1960s.
1. Plenaryjus tractatus for the federal government42
Possibly since the Treaty of Versailles in 191943 and, quite clearly, with
the Halibut Treaty in 1923," the emancipation of Canada vis-t-vis Great
Britain was fully realised in regards to the capacity to conclude international
42. This section borrows from my paper, S Beaulac, "Interldgalit6 et r6ception du droit international
en droit interne canadien et qu6bdcois" in S Beaulac & J-F Gaudreault-DesBiens, eds, JurisClasseurDroit constitutionnel (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) 23/1, section IV.
43. Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 189.
44. Conventionfor the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery ofthe North Pacific Ocean, Canada &
USA, 2 March 1923, BTS 18 (1925), 32 LNTS 93 (entered into force 22 October 1924).
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treaties, i.e. jus tractatus, which would be assumed by the Crown in right
of Canada, i.e., by the federal government. This constitutional practice,
de facto, was confirmed by binding constitutional rules, de jure, with
the Letters Patent of 1947 .4 Quebec's claims associated with the G6rinLajoie statement, which will be examined later on, must therefore be
contextualised right away, because the situation has been settled and
accepted as such by the different stakeholders, both internationally and
domestically (especially in Canada's judiciary) for almost a full century
(over 90 years). It would be surprising, to say the least, that efforts from
Quebecois political actors in the last couple of decades to create some sort
of myth (as personified by a former MNA) would wipe out the significance
of this long-standing position in Canada's and Quebec's public law.
Prior to examining domestic rules of constitutional law, a word on the
relevance of public international law on issues ofjus tractatus shall prove
useful.
a. Internationallaw not completely neutral on jus tractatus
It is important to address a preliminary point before focussing on the
basis for the Canadian federal government's plenary power regarding
jus tractatus. The competence to conclude conventions and treaties,
we are told, is a subject-matter that is governed by the domestic law of
each sovereign state of the international community; it would be of no
concern to international law. Indeed, the applicable law found in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties46 is deemed agnostic on the
issue of the authority of federated sub-states such as Canada's provinces to
create international obligations by means of agreements with other states.
According to section 6 of the Vienna Convention, it is the states that enjoy
the international capacity to conclude treaties; although propositions were
made during the drafting of section 6, no details were adopted to address
jus tractatus in regard to federal states. Thus we seem to have to agree
with Jacques-Yvan Morin, when he suggests that:
Le droit international renvoie au droit public interne de chaque
f6ddration lorsqu'il s'agit de d6terminer [if required] le degr6 de capacit6
internationale dont peuvent se r6clamer les collectivit6s composantes en
matibre de conclusion des trait6s.47

45. Letters PatentConstitutingthe Office of Governor Generaland Commander-in-Chiefof Canada
(1947), RSC 1985, Appendix 11,no 31.
46. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969),
Can TS 1980 No 37 (entered into force 27 January 1980).
47. J-Y Morin, "La personnalit6 internationale du Qu6bec" (1984) 1 RQDI 163, at 187.
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This being so, it does not mean, necessarily, that international law
is completely neutral with respect to jus tractatus. The main feature
to take into account when considering this topic is that the continuing
dominant epistemological understanding of international law is based
on the fundamental structural idea of the sovereignty of states. On the
international plane, the external dimension of state sovereigntyincluding treaty-making power and the responsibility in case of breach
-is exercised by one authority,4 8 i.e., the one government of the said
state (which, incidentally, is a constituting element to be considered a
state). In this regard, it is interesting to refer to section 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that: "A party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty." The irrelevance of national law to issues of violations
of international obligations extends to domestic constitutional law.49 This
was settled already in the Polish Nationals in Danzig Case, an advisory
opinion by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1931, where
it was held that: "a State cannot adduce as against another State its own
Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under
international law or treaties in force." 50
As a consequence, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that
international law is not at all informative as to the situation of federal
states and treaty-making power. The rules on state responsibility assume
and indeed are based on the premise that members of the international
community, be they unitary or federal states, speak with one voice in their
relations with others. One must not confuse, as an author seems to have
done recently," the general concept of international personality, which
non-state actors may be deemed to enjoy in some circumstances, with the
concept of legal orjuristic capacity to participate in international relations.
This is especially with regard to the creation of normativity, a capacity
viewed as inherent to sovereign states and, as suggested here, considered
exercised by them in a single voice (that of the central government in
federal states). The direct correlation between treaty-making power and
state responsibility in cases of breach, the latter being attributed to the
state as a whole, constitutes a strong indication under international law
48. On the external dimension of state sovereignty, see S Beaulac, "Emer de Vattel and the
Externalization of Sovereignty" (2003) 5 J Hist Int'l L 237.
49. R Jennings & A Watts, Oppenheim 's InternationalLaw, vol 1-Peace, 9th ed (Longman: London,
1992) at 254.
50. Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig
24
Territory(Advisory Opinion), [1931] PCIJ, series A/B, no 44, p .
et
la
conclusion des trait6s : ce qu'en dit
qu6bdcois
et
canadiens
51. See H Cyr, "Les souverainistes
le droit international public" (2010) 3 RQDC I at 13-16.
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that federal states act and come into relation with other international
community members as a single unit, including via the conclusion of
conventions and treaties.
An illustration confirming this non-neutral stance of general public
international law in regard to jus tractatus comes from the International
Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, endorsed by
resolution at the United Nations General Assembly.5 2 Article 4(1), in the
chapter dealing with the attribution of conduct to a State, provides thus:
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in
the organization of the State, and whatever its characteras an organ of
the central government or of a territorialunit of the State. [Emphasis
added]

Thus on the international plane, there is still nowadays no way around the
basic position that states are the main legal subjects and are expected to
act as single entities for the purpose of creating internationally binding
normativity (be it conventional or customary)-in exercising their
external sovereignty-because, in the end, it will be that one single central
authority that will be held accountable in law for international wrongful
acts such as breaching treaty obligations. This aspect, to say it again, is a
strong indication, albeit indirect, that general public international law has
a preference to have states speak with one voice with theirjus tractatus.
Such implicit positioning of international law is no doubt validated,
explicitly, by a quick comparative consideration of state practice in other
federal states, including the United States ofAmerica, 3 where the dominant
approach is clearly to have the central authority enjoy the plenary of power
to conclude international conventions and treaties.54
b.

The federal government plenarypower over jus tractatus

In Canada's public law-including that applicable in Quebec-the
arguments in regard to treaty-making are clearly and inexorably in favour
of the plenary power of the central authority, something that has been
settled for almost a century. In the discussion that follows, caselaw and

52. DraftArticles on the Responsibility ofStatesforInternationallyWrongful Acts, UNGAOR, 53rd
Sess, UNDOC A56/10 (2001) at 44.
53. See, for instance, the decision in UnitedStates v Curtiss-WrightExport Corp (1936) 299 US 304
at 318.
54. See the classic studies by AE Gotlieb, Canadian Treaty-Making (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968)
at 25-27; and GL Morris, "The Treaty Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma" (1967) 45 Can Bar Rev
478 at 492-497.
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other legal sources of constitutional law are examined with a view to
showing how, based on domestic positive law (to which international law
defers on issues ofjus tractatus),the material reality of the treaty-making
power leaves no doubt as to the federal government's plenary power.
Of course, the first normative element to consider regarding this
problematic is the landmark case known as the Labour Conventions
Case," which raised many issues of division of legislative authority in
relation to international treaties. Everyone will recall the facts of the case,
which involved three conventions concluded by the Canadian federal
government, under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation,
and in respect of which the federal Parliament had enacted three pieces of
legislation to implement them domestically. In the end, the Privy Council
held that these pieces of legislation were ultravires because, essentially, the
incorporation of international treaty (required under the so-called dualist
theory) must follow the division of legislative authorities under sections
91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 6 (known then as the British North
America Act). In this case, since the subject-matter of the conventions was
labour law, which fell under provincial authority, the federal Parliament
could not implement them by means of legislation. This feature is
accurately seen as the ratio decidendiof the Labour Conventions Case, the
one that was severely criticised by many legal writers (both Anglophones
and Francophones)" and even put in doubt by some Supreme Court of
Canada justices in a couple of obiter dicta in the 1950s and 1970s.11
The other highly important holding in the Labour Conventions Case
concernsjus tractatus,i.e., the power in Canada to conclude international
55. At the Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re The Weekly Rest in Industrial UndertakingAct,
The Minimum Wages Act and The Limitation ofHours of Work Act, [ 1936] SCR 461; and at the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, Attorney GeneralforCanadavAtorney Generalfor Ontario, [1937]
AC 326.
56. Supra note 10.
57. See, for instance, NAM MacKenzie, "Canada and the Treaty-Making Power" (1937) 15 Can
Bar Rev 436; NAM MacKenzie, "Canada: The Treaty-Making Power" (1937) 18 BritYB Int'l L 172;
VC MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years After" (1937) 15 Can Bar Rev 419; FR
Scott, "The Consequence of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15 Can Bar Rev 485; AB Elkin, "De
la compdtence du Canada pour conclure les traitis internationaux-Etude sur le statut juridique des
Dominions britanniques" (1938) 45 RGDIP 658; GJ Szablowski, "Creation and Implementation of
Treaties in Canada" (1956) 34 Can Bar Rev 28; FR Scott, "Labour Conventions Case: Lord Wright's
Undisclosed Dissent" (1956) 34 Can Bar Rev 114; E McWhinney, "Federal Constitutional Law and the
Treaty-Making Power" (1957) 35 Can Bar Rev 842; E McWhinney, "The Constitutional Competence
within Federal Systems as to International Agreements" (1964) 1 Can Legal Stud 145; GV La Forest,
"The Labour Conventions Case Revisited" (1974) 12 Can YB Int'l Law 137; and S Beaulac, "The
Canadian Federal Constitutional Framework and the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol" (2005) 5
Revue juridique polyn6sienne (hors sdrie) 125.
58. See Justice Kerwin in Francis v The Queen, [1956] SCR at 621; and Chief Justice Laskin in
MacDonaldv Vapor CanadaLtd, [ 1977] 2 RCS 134 at 169-171.
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treaties with other states. It is true that, strictly speaking, the ratio decidendi
of the decision at the Privy Council was limited to the issue of treaty
implementation, but it would be an error to stop the analysis there and
then assume that there is a kind of vacuum in our public law with regard
to treaty making.59 Indeed, we will see that, short of explicitly ruling on
the issue of jus tractatus, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
nonetheless took the view that the federal government had plenary treatymaking power, and more importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Labour Conventions Case did take an explicit position on the issue, which
has been the governing law since.
It is unfounded to say that the Privy Council did not take a stand onjus
tractatus in its 1937 judgment. The confusion comes from the following
passage in Lord Atkin's speech, stating that his decision is taken on the
basis of the lack of legislative competence to incorporate the treaties at
hand:
Reverting again to the original analysis of the contentions of the parties,
it will be seen that the Provincial contention I.(b) relates only to the
formation of the treaty obligation, while I.(c) has reference to the alleged
limitation of both executive and legislative action by the express terms
of the treaty. If, however, the Dominion Parliament was never vested
with legislative authority to perform the obligation, these questions do
not arise. And, as their Lordships have come to the conclusion that the
reference can be decided upon the question of legislative competence
alone, in accordance with their usual practice in constitutional matters
they refrain from expressing any opinion upon the question raised60by the
contentions I.(b) and (c), which in that event become immaterial.
A proper reading of Lord Atkin's opinion, however, requires one to
take into account other passages that, quite clearly, show where the Privy
Council stands on Canada's jus tractatus. When dwelling upon treaty
implementation and the necessary collaboration between the executive and
legislative branch of government, all the more complex given the federal
nature of the country, Lord Atkin takes for granted that the Crown in right
of Canada (i.e., the federal government) enjoys full treaty-making power,
independently of the subject-matter of the convention. Here is the excerpt:
The obligations imposed by treaty may have to be performed, if at all,
by several Legislatures; and the [federal] executive have the task of
obtainingthe legislative assent not of the one Parliamentto whom they
59. This is a common mistake by Quebec legal writers, which is what Hugo Cyr did in his PhD
thesis, published as H Cyr, CanadianFederalism and Treaty Powers-OrganicConstitutionalismat
Work (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang (Diversitas), 2009).
60. Attorney Generalfor CanadaVAttorney Generalfor Ontario, supranote 55 at 348-349.
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may be responsible, but possibly of several Parliaments to whom they
stand in no direct relation. 6 1
Suggesting that this is a mere obiter dictum only begs the question.
Albeit it is not necessary to decide the case at the Privy Council, this is
a compelling (implicit) indication that Lord Atkin viewed the federal
government as fully empowered to conclude every and any international
treaty on behalf of Canada.
There is another even more probative passage in the judgment, which
in fact not only endorsed the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in regard
tojus tractatus-whichis examined in a moment-but also expressed the
view that the Crown in right of Canada enjoys full treaty-making power:
It is true, as pointed out in the judgment of the Chief Justice, that as the
[federal] executive is now clothed with the powers of making treaties

so the Parliament of Canada, to which the executive is responsible,
has imposed upon it responsibilities in connection with such treaties,
for if it were to disapprove of them they would either not be made or
the Ministers would meet their constitutional fate. But this is true of all
executive functions in their relation to Parliament. There is no existing
constitutional ground for stretching the competence of the Dominion
Parliament so that it becomes enlarged to keep pace with enlarged

functions of the Dominion executive.62

Clearly, when Lord Atkin says that, for the purpose of treaty implementation,
he cannot extend the power of the federal legislative branch of government
to correspond to that exercised by the federal executive branch of
government for the purpose of treaty making, the premise is that Ottawa
has the plenary authority in regard to the latter. Put another way, more than
an obiterobservation, we have here an element at the heart of ruling to the
effect that the division of legislative authorities dictates who is competent
to implement depending on the subject-matter of the convention or the
treaty, namely that the jus tractatus is part of the "enlarged functions of
the Dominion [federal] executive," which was the ratio decidendi at the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Labour Convention Case.

Indeed, unlike the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, what
became the highest court of the land shortly thereafter was of the viewnot implicitly, but quite explicitly-in a split decision handed down in
1936, that the case must be ruled in favour of the federal government and,
to be precise, should be decided first and foremost on the basis of Ottawa's

61. Ibidat 348 [emphasis added].
62. Ibid at 352 [emphasis added].

The Myth of Jus Tractatus in La Belle Province:
Quebec's G~rin-Lajoie Statement

253

plenary power over jus tractatus.63 As a result, it is a simple matter of
jurisprudence that, short of a ruling by the top judicial authority (Privy
Council) in this case on the issue of treaty-making power-though there
was an implicit opinion clearly expressed by Lord Atkin, as we saw-the
highest court to rule on the issue was the Supreme Court of Canada and
its conclusion in the Labour Conventions Case ought to be accepted as
representing the applicable law. To be sure, the Privy Council says that it
provides no (explicit) opinion as regards treaty-making power, deciding
on the basis of treaty implementation, but Lord Atkin obviously does not
overrule the Supreme Court of Canada on jus tractatus. Thus it is fair
to say that, since the 1930s, the plenary power to conclude treaties was
recognised to belong to the federal government, precisely since the Labour
Conventions Case. As John H. Currie explained in his textbook, 64 this has
been the law since the 1930s in Canada (and in Quebec too), because
no Canadian court (or Quebec court) has put into doubt or reconsidered
the validity of this unwritten constitutional rule; in fact, the only time
the Supreme Court of Canada expressly addressed the issue again was
in Thomson v Thomson, where Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 (with McLachlin
J.) wrote in a concurring set of reasons that the federal government had
"exclusive" treaty-making jurisdiction. 65
To recap, for nearly a century, the law concerning this country's jus
tractatushas been settled: the Crown in right of Canada, that is to say, the
federal government, enjoys plenary power when it comes to the conclusion
of international conventions and treaties. To be clear, this entails that
Ottawa can strike such agreements with other states, whether the subject
matter is federal or provincial (ss 91 or 92, ConstitutionAct, 1867). This

63. See the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re The Weekly Rest in Industrial
UndertakingAct, The Minimum Wages Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, supranote 55,
split 4-3, with the main opinion expressing the plurality view on the validity of the federal statutes (a
conclusion overruled on appeal at the Privy Council) written by Chief Justice Duff (with Davis and
Kerwin JJ); the plurality view was to the effect that Ottawa was competent to implement the treaties
(the point overruled on appeal) and also, quite importantly here, to conclude the said international
conventions (even if the subject-matter is provincial). Dissenting on treaty implementation, Crocket
J agreed with the Chief Justice and his two colleagues on jus tractatus (ibid at 535): "While I agree
with the learned Chief Justice that the Government of Canada must now be held to be the proper
medium for the formal conclusion of international conventions, whether they affect the Dominion
as a whole or any of the provinces separately [...]." In sum, on the plenary treaty-making power
of the federal government, there is a clear majority at the Supreme Court of Canada in the Labour
Conventions Case, which is the applicable law in this country.
64. JH Currie, Public InternationalLaw, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 240.
65. Thomson v Thomson, [1994] 3 SCR 551 at para 112-113. The fact that the Justices mistook on
the continuing application of section 132 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867-a mere "judicial slip" as John
Currie suggested, ibid note 64 at 239-should not affect the validity of the opinion that jus tractatus
is fully federal.
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is the uninterrupted practice, defacto, in this country since 1919 with the
end of World War I-or at least since the 1923 Halibut Treaty-which
was confirmed, de jure, by the decisions in the Labour Conventions Case
by the Privy Council (implicitly) and by the Supreme Court of Canada
(explicitly). This dejure situation was finalised, in a way, with the 1947
Letters Patent regarding the office of Government General, officialising
the transfer of all powers from Westminster to Ottawa, especially royal
prerogatives, the actual normative source of authority forjus tractatus (as
we will see in a moment).
This understanding of applicable law has gone unchallenged in caselaw
and was also accepted as such by all the other legal and political actors for
a long time.. .up until the mid-1960s, in fact. 6 6 The rhetoric out of Quebec
City prompted Ottawa to write down in a document the rules according to
which international relations have been conduced in this country, which
included the normative foundation for the federal government's plenary
jus tractatus.67 This is the material reality; let us examine now the mythical
reality since Paul G6rin-Lajoie's political statement.
c. The Girin-Lajoiepoliticalstatement
Although not expressed with the same zeal over the years, more recently
the political position of the province of Quebec is, at least publicly, against
the constitutional rules providing for plenary jus tractatus to the federal
government. Many stakeholders-politicians and academics-have
adopted the habit of associating their claims in favour of recognising a
provincial treaty-making power that matches their legislative competences
to a political statement made by then Education Minister Paul G6rinLajoie. 68 This is sometimes referred to, mainly by secessionist-leaning
actors, as a "doctrine," insinuating that it might have some normative
value, suggesting that it is a position on par, as it were, to the legal situation
prevailing in our constitutional law. The collective book published in
2006, entitled Les relations internationalesdu Qudbec depuis la doctrine
Girin-Lajoie(1965-2005),69 is a forceful example where some academics
66. See Currie, supra note 64 at 239; and Morris, supranote 54 at 484.
67. See Government of Canada, Federalismand InternationalRelations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1968).
68. Interestingly, one notes that the speech from which this political statement is taken was made,
not inside the provincial legislature-called the National Assembly in Quebec-not even in front of
a domestic or local audience; indeed, it was in a presentation before a group of foreign diplomats,
in Montreal, that is deemed to be so influential. It was much much later, when the secessionist
government of Ren6 Levesque's Parti qu6becois was in power in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that
the Gerin-Lajoie political statement was formally endorsed.
69. S Paquin, Les relationsinternationalesdu Quebec depuis la doctrine Gdrin-Lajoie(1965-2005)
(Quebec: Presses de l'Universitd Laval, 2006).
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in this province-including lawyers 7 0 -try hard to construct a mythical
reality and, more importantly, a new rhetorical significance and semiotic
effect associated with this political statement.
It is contagious, perhaps, as one can see the influence of nationalist
academics-Benoit Pelletier, for onen-on the Quebec government.
Nowadays, quite surprisingly, even the Quebec Liberal Party argues
in favour of autonomous provincial jus tractatus, as the following
statement by former Premier Jean Charest illustrates: "Ce qui est de
compdtence qu6b6coise chez nous est de comp6tence qu6b6coise partout."
72 Although catchy, this is another mere political statement or slogan, a
unilateral declaration in fact; to be clear, statements such as this have no
influence whatsoever on the state of the law in this country, i.e., on our
constitutional law. Nor does the legislation enacted under then-Premier
Lucien Bouchard and his secessionist Parti qu6b6cois government, namely
the Loi sur 1'exercice des droits fondamentaux et des prdrogatives du
people quebicois et de l 'tat du Qudbec." Leaving aside the obvious ultra
vires nature of this statute, it is noteworthy that, for all purposes, section
7(1) would seem to give legal force to the G6rin-Lajoie statement: "The
Quebec State is free to consent to be bound by any treaty, convention or
international agreement in matters under its constitutional jurisdiction."
This being so, any respectable constitutional lawyer would agree that the
Quebec legislature cannot unilaterally change the jus tractatus rules in
such a (cavalier) way. This is "constitution-fiction law" or, as it shall be
shown below, an attempt to build a mythical reality regarding provincial
treaty-making power.
What is the constitutional legal basis for Quebec's claims expressed
in terms of the Gerin-Lajoie statement? Is there, in effect, any foundation
in positive public law to support the arguments put forward in favour
of a provincial jus tractatus? Essentially, the argument is based on a
70. See the recent attempt by UQAM law professor Hugo Cyr, Canadian Federalism and Treaty
Powers-OrganicConstitutionalism at Work, supra note 59. Even one (only one to my knowledge)
Anglo-Canadian author, influenced by former BQ and PQ politician and international law professor
Daniel Turp, has joined the group arguing in favour of provincial jus tractatus: see G van Ert, "The
Legal Character of Provincial Agreements with Foreign Governments" (2001) 42 C de D 1093.
71. MNA Benoit Pelletier chaired a special committee on intergovernmental affairs that produced a
final report, entitled A Projectfor Quebec: Affirmation, Autonomy and Leadership(Montreal: Quebec
Liberal Party, 2001) which, for all purposes, endorses the Gdrin-Lajoie statement.
72. Speech by the Premier Jean Charest at Ecole nationale de l'administration publique, 25 February
<http://www.premier.gouv.qc.ca/general/discours/archivesdiscours/2004/fevrier/
online:
2004,
dis20040225.htm>. See also M David, "La doctrine Charest," Le Devoir (23 November 2004) A-3.
73. Loi sur l'exercice des droitsfondamentauxet des prdrogatives dupeuple qubicois et de I'Etat
du Qudbec, LRQ, c E-20.2. In English, An Act respectingthe Exercise of the fundamental rights and
prerogativesof the Quebec people and the Quebec State.
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tendentious reading of the main decisions that developed the thesis or
the theory known as the "two-Crown approach," particularly relevant to
the issue of royal prerogative. In fact, preliminarily, a word is in order to
explain how the royal prerogative is the legal basis to jus tractatus; then
follows the caselaw on the two-crown approach.
III. Jus tractatus based on royalprerogative
Let us first recall that, with respect to treaties as a source of international
law, we must highlight different steps in the process of treaty-making:
negotiation, signature, ratification (or other means of state consent, such
as adherence), registration, publication, and coming into force. All of
these features are the concern of international law and, as the case may
require, must be distinguished from the need for implementation, which
is a domestic law operation that can be accomplished differently (things
that fall outside the present study). Both groups of issues, however, share
one domestic aspect, namely to know which state organ is entrusted with
which function: of negotiating and concluding treaties, for instance, or
of incorporating domestically international conventions. The latter, we
mentioned earlier, is done in Canada by means of implementing legislation,
meaning that it is Parliament (the legislative branch of government)
that is competent to incorporate conventional international law; such
implementing legislation must also, as we recalled, follow the division of
legislative competence (federal, provincial) pursuant to the Constitution

Act, 1867.74
What is calledjus tractatus(i.e., treaty-making power) concerns first
and foremost issues surrounding the state organ entrusted to conduct
the negotiation and conclusion of treaties (and the different steps in the
process). Put another way, within a Montesquieu analytical structure
separating legislative, executive and judicial powers, who is competent to
conclude international treaties and conventions with other states and, most
importantly, what is the legal source for such authority? The first thing to
say is that this question of domestic enablement is governed by domestic
public law, not by public international law. Though this point may sound
trite, it is nevertheless useful to recall that the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties only says that any state has the capacity to conclude
treaties, leaving the issue of who within the state can conduct such activity
to the internal organisation of the state. No matter who has thejus tractatus
domestically, international law will hold a state to its word, pacta sunt

74. See comments in relation to the Privy Council decision in the Labour Conventions Case, supra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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servanda,considering the state accountable if the international obligations
are breached.
In Canada, the domestic source of law relevant to treaty-making
power and, more generally, the jurisdiction over international relations
and foreign affairs is the so-called royal prerogative. "When we speak in
our day of a Prerogative of the Crown," it was once explained, "we mean
a right that remains in the Sovereign as one of that bundle of discretionary
common law rights which were, at and by the common law, exercisable
by the Sovereign in person."7 Similarly, Sir William Blackstone wrote:
"By the word prerogative, we usually understand that special preeminence which the King hath over and above all other persons, and out
of the ordinary course of common law, in right of his regal dignity." 76 The
distinguishing feature, therefore, of a power or authority based on royal
prerogative is that it need not be authorised by statute, i.e., by an enabling
piece of legislation. This is, in a way, an exception to the general principle
under the rule of law, known as legality, which generally means that the
executive branch of government must base its action on enabling law. Of
course, given that the source of royal prerogatives is the common law, i.e.,
judge-made-law, they are said to constitute "residue of power"7 in relation
to other legally authorised competence. In other words, Parliament can
always modify, curtail or abolish a prerogative of the Crown by means of
legislation7 1; this is how one must understand the old adage that "the King
hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.""
Traditionally, and still nowadays, based on its prerogatives, the British
Crown has been the exclusive and plenary power-holder in regard to the
conduct of foreign affairs and issues of international relations. This includes
matters such as the declaration of war or neutrality, the establishment
or severance of diplomatic relations, the negotiation and conclusion of
conventions and treaties, the exercise of consular or diplomatic protection,
and representation towards international claims and remedial measures. To
be clear, for all these issues-according to the Anglo-Saxon parliamentary
75. WF O'Connor, Report to the HonourableSpeaker of the Senate on the British North America
Act, 1867 (Ottawa: Patenaude, 1939) Annex 1, 146.
76. W Blackstone, Commentarieson the Laws ofEngland, in Four Books, 13th ed (London: Strahan,
1800) at 239.
77. AV Dicey, Introductionto the Study ofthe Law ofthe Constitution, 10th ed (London: Macmillan,
1959) at 424, wrote that royal prerogatives are "nothing else than the residue of discretionary or
arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown." See also Reference
as to the Effect of the Exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy Upon Deportation Proceedings,
[1933] RCS 269.
78. See the opinion of the House of Lords in Attorney GeneralvDe Keyer's Royal Hotel, [1920] AC
508 (HL).
79. Case ofProclamation,(1611) 12 Co Rep 74 at 76 (QB).
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system of public law-the executive branch of government can exercise
its power based on common law Crown prerogatives, that is to say, without
any legislative type of authority. Specifically, with respect to jus tractatus,
Justice Read once explicated thus:
The treaty-making is part of the Royal Prerogative. An international
agreement is negotiated by representatives acting under the authority
of the Crown, signed by them and, subsequently ratified by the Crown.
When it has been thus signed and ratified, it creates an international
obligation binding upon the State as an international person. Legally,
the approval of Parliament is not necessary, at any stage, to create an
international obligation."
In Canada, it follows that the issue as to the constitutional situs of legislative
power over treaty-making, i.e., to know whether it falls under s 91 or s 92
of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, seems to be highly hypothetical and without
any real significance, given that it is a prerogative-based authority."
Naturally, the judge-made-law nature of royal prerogatives means
that, at the time jus tractatus started de facto in Canada in the 1920s
and was confirmed de jure with the 1947 Letters Patent, the legislative
branch could have intervened to modify, curtail or abolish the basis of
such authority. But it did not: neither the federal Parliament in Ottawa
nor, hypothetically, the different provincial legislatures manifested any
intention whatsoever to interfere with the Crown prerogative over foreign
affairs and international relations that Canada inherited from Great Britain.
In fact, the whole story is that, since then, there has been no attempt by
Parliament at the federal level (whose executive has discharged this
country'sjustractatusuninterrupted) to modify, curtail or abolish the royal
prerogative over foreign affairs and international relations. Undoubtedly,
the legislative branch can, but it does not. To be precise, the legislative
branches of governments in this country -both federal and provincialdid not manifest themselves in the 1920s or in 1947, which in federalism
terms, has sealed the deal (so to speak) ofjus tractatus in favour of the
federal government. This is the bulk of the problem with the G6rin-Lajoie
statement, as we will now see.

80. JE Read, "International Agreements" (1948) 26 Can Bar Rev 520 at 525.
81. See, generally, JM Roland, "Cancelling Charters of Canadian Companies: Division of Prerogative
Powers" (1963) 21 UT Fac L Rev 75.
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IV. No legal basisfor the Girin-Lajoiestatement
The few serious legal academics who have attempted to flesh out a
constitutional basis for a provincial treaty-making power,82 that would
correspond to the subject-matters under section 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, have revisited two fundamental decisions by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, namely Liquidators of Maritime Bank83
and Bonanza Creek.8 4 These cases are the basis for the so-called "twoCrown approach" in Canadian constitutional law, which is of course most
relevant to issues of Crown prerogative such as those pertaining to jus
tractatus. According to the Quebec position, the combined effect of the
two judicial pronouncements, read in a clearly result-oriented fashion,
would be to justify (similarly to treaty implementation) a power to
conclude international treaties and conventions to both the Crown in right
of Canada and the Crown in right of a province.
But what was actually held in these cases? Liquidators of Maritime
Bank was handed down in 1892 and the argument was to the effect that
the Governor General of Canada was the only representative of the Crown
in the country. In rejecting that view, the Privy Council wrote that, "a
Lieutenant-Governor, when appointed, is as much the representative of Her
Majesty for all purposes ofprovincial government as the Governor-General
himself is for all purposes of Dominion government."" Lord Watson
insisted on the importance of the division of authorities, both legislative
and executive, between the federal and the provincial governments:
The object of the Act [Constitution Act 1867] was neither to weld
the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial governments
to central authority, but to create a federal government in which they
should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive administration
of affairs in which they had a common interest, each province retaining
its own independence and autonomy. That object was accomplished
by distributing, between the Dominion and the provinces, all powers
executive and legislative, and all public property and revenues which had
previously belonged to the provinces; so that the Dominion government
should be vested with such of these powers, property and revenues as
were necessary for the due performance of its constitutional functions,
and that the remainder should be retained by the provinces for the
purposes of provincial government. 6
82. The main proponent was no doubt former MNA under the secessionist Parti qudbicois
government of Rend L6vesque, professor Jacques-Yvan Morin, University of Montreal: see J-Y
Morin, "La personnalit6 intemationale du Quebec" (1984) 1 RQDI 163; and J-Y Morin, "Le Qu6bec
et le pouvoir de conclure des accords internationaux" (1966) 1 Etudes juridiques canadienne 136.
83. LiquidatorsofMaritime Bank v Receiver GeneralofNew Brunswick, [1892] AC 437 (PC).
84. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Ltd v Rex, [ 1916] 1AC 566 (PC).
85. LiquidatorsofMaritime Bank, supra note 83 at 443.
86. Ibidat441.
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The latter point, that both executive and legislative powers are
distributed pursuant to s 91 and s 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, was
confirmed in Bonanza Creek, rendered in 1916. In an extensive judgment,
Viscount Haldane opined that "the distribution under the new grant of
executive authority in substance follows the distribution under the new
grant of legislative powers."" In sum, the British Crown is divisible in
Canada, upon the federalist lines, a basic constitutional principle that was
held to apply mutatis mutandis to the prerogatives of the Crown, which are
also divisible between the federal and provincial governments."
The Quebec position refers to these two cases to support a provincial
jus tractatus,for subject-matters under s 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.
The argument is that, given that treaty-making is a power of the Crown
and that prerogatives follow the constitutional division of authorities,
the executives of the provinces should be able to conclude treaties on
provincial issues and, for its part, the federal executive treaty-making
power should be limited to federal subject-matters. This reasoning,
however, is no less than a syllogism, that is to say, it constitutes a truncated
statement that gives the falsified impression that there is a foundation
in Canada's written constitutional law relating to foreign affairs and
international relations. This suggestion is utterly wrong because, since at
least the 1937 decision of the Privy Council in the Labour Conventions
Case,89 it has been crystal clear that this country's positive law in the
written constitutional documents says nothing about the domestic power
in relation to international conventions; there is no "international" subjectmatter under s 91 and s 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, be it in regard to
treaty making or treaty implementation.
Indeed, it is not written constitutional norms, but rather the commonlaw based prerogative of the Crown that is the legal source of authority,
in our constitutional law, over foreign affairs and international relations,
as we just explained. These judge-made-law unwritten rules are part of a
distinct feature of Canada's constitutional law, namely that the positive
public law dealing with our constitution is formed of written legal
rules and of unwritten legal rules, both normatively binding (not to be
confused with the so-called political constitution, i.e., conventional

87. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Ltd, supranote 84 at 580.
88. See British Columbia Power Corp v British Columbia Electric Co [1962] SCR 642 at 644-645;
and Air Canadav British Columbia (Attorney General), [1986] 2 SCR 539 at para 9.
89. Attorney Generalfor Canadav Attorney Generalfor Ontario,supranote 55 at 351.

The Myth of Jus Tractatus in La Belle Province:
Quebec's G6rin-Lajoie Statement

261

rules).90 To be precise, given that treaty-making power is purely a Crown
prerogative-type of authority, there is no need to invoke s 91 and s 92 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 to establish the constitutional foundation for
these activities conducted by the executive branch of government on the
international plane. Put another way, it is a public power that the Crown
is entrusted to exercise alone, without the participation of Parliament and,
in the Canadian context, without bothering with the issues of legislative
division of authorities under the Constitution Act, 1867. In sum, it is a
common law-based unwritten rule that authorises the government in terms
ofjus tractatus.
This was the legal situation in Great Britain in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, where the British Crown exercised, with no involvement
of the Westminster, the authority over foreign affairs and international
relations, not only for its own sake, but also on behalf of Canada and other
dominions. In fact, the domestic practice in Great Britain has remained the
same to this day, that is to say, Parliament is not formally involved in the
making of international conventions (in spite of the so-called "Ponsonby
rule").9' To go back to the relevant time, which is the time jus tractatus
migrated (was transferred), both defacto and de jure, from Great Britain
to Canada around the turn of the 1920s-confirmed with the 1947 Letters
Patent-the practice of all parties involved (in Great Britain, in Canada)
was the same: namely that treaty-making was the sole responsibility of
the Crown. Thus it was a migration and/or transfer of power from the
Imperial Crown in Great Britain to Canada, precisely to the Crown in right
of Canada, that occurred then and was confirmed in 1947 with the Letters
Patent.
Peter Hogg is certainly right to say that: "The current instrument
of delegation [of treaty-making] is a comprehensive document which
was adopted in 1947 and which is entitled Letters Patent [in which] no
prerogative power over Canada is withheld"92 by the Imperial Crown. The
following two clauses are particularly on point:

90. See M St-Hilaire & L Bich-Carri-re, "La constitution juridique et politique du Canada:
notions, sources et principes," in S Beaulac & J-F Gaudreault-DesBiens, eds, JurisClasseur-Droit
constitutionnel (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) 23/1, para 7.
91. See SW Templeton, "Treaty-Making and the British Parliament" (1991) 67 Chicago-Kent L Rev
457 at 466. For a different interpretation of the British situation, which seems to exaggerate the impact
of parliamentary courtesy on practice, see J Harrington, "Redresing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty
Law Making: (Re-) Establishing a Role for Parliament" (2005) 50 McGill U 465 at 485 et seq.
92. PW Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,5th ed (loose-leaf) (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell,
2007) § 11.2.
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(2) And We do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor-General
with the advice of Our Privy Council for Canada or of any members
thereof or individually, as the case requires, to exercise all powers and
authorities lawfully belonging to Us in respect of Canada.
(3) And We do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor-General to
keep and use Our Great Seal of Canada for sealing all things whatsoever
that may be passed under Our Great Seal of Canada.
I share the view expressed by Hogg that: "This language undoubtedly
delegates to the federal government of Canada the power to enter
into treaties binding Canada."9 3 Indeed, this confirmed, not only the
uninterrupted practice of the time, but also the legal situation based, as
we saw, on both judgments in the Labour Conventions Case, of the Privy
Council (implicitly recognising plenary power to the federal government)
and the Supreme Court of Canada (the majority of justices explicitly
holding such exclusive jus tractatus for Ottawa).
Hypothetically, there could have been an argument in favour of
provincial treaty-making power, perhaps, at the time Canada started to
exercise its independent authority over foreign affairs and international
relations, that is to say, at the turn of the 1920s and in the following decades.
Given the power's foundation in the common law royal prerogative, one
can surely imagine provincial legislatures intervening and, plausibly,
exercising their sovereign authority to claim a delegation ofjus tractatus
in regard to their subject-matters under s 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.
But no such legal contention was put forward by any of the provinces
(except, in a way, in the Labour Conventions Case), which renders such
a hypothesis unverifiable. The truth of the matter is that, when the practice
in this country concerning treaty-making power became crystallised in the
1920s and, more importantly, when the plenary authority of the Crown in
right of Canada in that regard (established in the Labour Conventions Case)
was confirmed in the 1947 Letters Patent, the provinces acquiesced and
accepted that de facto and dejure situation. In our positive constitutional
law, therefore, it became a done deal.
To a large extent, one needs to be a revisionist of historical
developments and factual events surrounding our constitutional law to
imply, as the proponents of the Gdrin-Lajoie statement do, that the Letters
Patent have no significance for issues of jus tractatus.94 It participates, as

93. Ibid
94. For instance, see H Cyr, CanadianFederalism and Treaty Powers-OrganicConstitutionalism
at Work, supra note 59.

The Myth of Jus Tractatus in La Belle Province:
Quebec's Gbrin-Lajoie Statement

263

we will see shortly, in the construction of mythical reality, suggesting as
factual things that are contested at best.
Specifically, what is the easy answer to the argument out of Quebec
City that the two-Crown approach supports provincial treaty-making
power? The real logic behind the Liquidators of Maritime Bank and
Bonanza Creek cases is thus: executive powers do parallel legislative
powers (provided for in s 91 and s 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867),
given the plurality of Crowns in this country, but one needs to have a
legislative situs for such an authority to invoke the principle. Put another
way, if the subject-matter--in our case, jus tractatus-pertainssolely to
the executive branch, based on Crown prerogative, without any legislative
foundation (other than hypothetically), then the suggested two-Crown-type
of reasoning is of no avail. Liquidators of Maritime Bank and Bonanza
Creek assume that the subject matter falls under the legislative authority
of the federal government or the provincial government, and thus hold that
the two levels of executive authorities share the power too. But here, as far
as treaty-making power is concerned, no legislative basis exists; it is solely
a matter under the authority of the executive branch. It would be to distort
the ratio decidendi in those two judgments of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council to suggest they apply to the issue ofjus tractatus.
Conclusion
There we have it: the historical facts and the legal constitutional context
relevant to the issue surroundingjus tractatus in this country. To conclude,
let us come back to the core of this paper's hypothesis, namely that the
Gdrin-Lajoie statement is a myth-a soteriological/heroic myth, 5 to
be precise-that has been constructed for some time in this province,
more intensively in the last 15 years it seems, with a view to providing
a contended legal basis for a provincial treaty-making power, one that
would correspond to its division of powers under s 92 of the Constitution
Act 1867 (and which, incidentally, is followed for treaty implementation).
The G6rin-Lajoie myth, like any other myth, may be liable to have
a gigantic semiotic effect on Quebec society, as representing a kind of
incontestable truth to justify, in constitutional terms, a provincial power to
conclude conventions and treaties on the international plane. Here is how,
in semiotic terms, the linguistic sign originally representing and creating
the material reality became a mythical sign that, indeed, is associated with
a mythical reality pertaining to jus tractatus.

95.

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Although the Gdrin-Lajoie statement was originally meant to be
no more than a political stand by the province of Quebec, it has come
to represent and create a different reality, one that portrays provincial
jus tractatus as well founded in Canada's public law. As explained
earlier, myth triggers reality to become large than life. Material reality
expressed in terms of Idgos (logical reasoning)-here the plenary federal
treaty-making power-becomes contested and indeed replaced by
mythical reality expressed in mithos terms (fictitious narrative)-here
the concurrent provincial jus tractatus for s 92 subject-matters-but it
nevertheless remains considered by (Quebec) society in terms of Idgos,
as simply representing/participating in reality, full stop. Put another way,
the actual Idgos that became a mrithos reverted back to being viewed as
logos, that is, to being a rational explanation of the issues at hand (treatymaking power) based, this time, on a belief-system that unquestionably
holds as valid and true the relevant historical events and legal accounts.
Consciously or not, people in the province of Quebec-too many of them,
one could say-cease to care about the material reality, the practice of
almost hundred years in this country and quite compelling caselaw and
constitutional documents supporting the orthodoxy of plenary power over
treaty-making for Ottawa. As a consequence, one can see that the semiotic
power carried by the Gdrin-Lajoie statement, clearly, is increased tenfold
when it becomes a myth which, in turn, is strategically used to have
considerable impact on the collective consciousness in Quebec.
Moreover, given that the hypothesis considered here must be
apprehended within the positive legal epistemology of Canada's
constitutional law, the following additional point is apposite. When
language (words, myths) becomes law, its corresponding social effect
increases all the more. Borrowing from Jean-Jacques Rousseau,96 Philip

96. See J- Rousseau, Discours sur L'Economie Politique (Geneva: Emanuel Du Villand, 1758) at
15-16: "Par quel art inconcevable a-t-on pu trouver le moyen d'assujettir les hommes pour les rendre
libres? D'employer au service de l'Etat les biens, les bras, & la vie mime de tous ses membres, sans
les contraindre & sans les consulter? D'enchainer leur volont6 de leur propre aveu? De faire valoir leur
consentement contre leur refus, & de les forcer A se punir eux-mimes quand ils font ce qu'ils n'ont
pas voulu? Comment se peut-il faire qu'ils ob6issent & que personne ne commande, qu'ils servent &
n'ayent point de Maitre; d'autant plus libres en effet, que, sous une apparente sujition, nul ne perd de
sa libert6 que ce qui peut nuire Acelle d'un autre? Ces prodiges sont l'ouvrage de la loi. C'est Ala loi
seule que les hommes doivent la justice & la libertb" [emphasis added] [spelling modemised].
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Allot opined, as it were, that law is the continuing structure-system of
human socialising. 7 In the context of international law, he writes:
Law, including international law, has a threefold social function. (1)
Law carries the structures and systems of society through time. (2) Law
inserts the common interest of society into the behaviour of societymembers. (3) Law establishes possible futures for society, in accordance
with society's theories, values and purposes.98
When language becomes mythical, when a linguistic sign becomes a
myth within a second-order sign-system and, consequently, gets to be larger
than life-like the G6rin-Lajoie statement-the semiotic effect is immense
as it erases the contestable nature of material reality. Further, when a myth
finds its way into the law, in our case Canada's and Quebec's constitutional
law, then the semiotics are augmented exponentially. Although within a
mythical sign-system, the G6rin-Lajoie political statement contributes
greatly, in an organic fashion, to influence the shared consciousness of
society, via a second-order mythical constitutional reality that is deemed
to participate in the self-ordering of society, of Quebec society, as the true
constitutional basis for provincial jus tractatus.
Quite surprisingly, this description is not a constructed fiction; it is
deemed the incontestable reality for a large number of stakeholders in la
belle province, including lawyers at the provincial Department of Justice,
as well as legal advisers to the Premier of Quebec since Lucien Bouchard
in the late 1990s. Witness, for instance, how the myth of a jus tractatus
for the province of Quebec was certainly instrumental to the enactment,
in 2000, of a blatantly and utterly ultra vires piece of legislation. As
mentioned earlier,99 the Loi sur l'exercice des droitsfondamentaux et des
prdrogatives du peuple qubicois et de l 'tat du Qudbec-in English, An
Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights andprerogatives of
the Quebec people and the Quebec State-provides for and dwells upon
the matter in which the provincial authority may exercise, inter alia,

97. See P Allott, Eunomia-New Orderfor a New World (Oxford & New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990) at 110: "Law is the self-directed becoming of society. Law is the purposive self-ordering
of society. In the law-reality, the reconciliation of impulse and necessity, desire, and obligation, is
actualized as possibilities which may then be actualized in willing and acting. In the law-reality, social
identity is actualized as possibilities which may then be actualized in willing and acting. In the lawreality, structures of power are actualized as possibilities which may then be actualized in willing and
acting. In the law-reality, values are actualized as possibilities which may then be actualized in willing
and acting. In the law-reality, justice is actualized as possibilities which may then be actualized in
willing act acting."
98. PAllott, "The Concept of International Law" (1999) 10 EJIL 31 at 31.
99. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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power in regard to international treaties. This is serious fiction, one would
be tempted to say.
This being so, it might be the reality for many people in this province,
but it must be clear that this is mythical reality. This soteriological/heroic
myth might be all useful, in semiotic terms, for the nationalist project of
Quebec, but it must be said loud and clear that the Gerin-Lajoie statement
is not founded on material reality. Instead, in view of the relevant historical
events, based on continuous practice in this country and even given our
positive constitutional law, let us affirm it unequivocally: Ottawa holds
plenary power over Canada's foreign affairs and international relations,
which includes exclusive power for the negotiation and conclusion of all
conventions or treaties on the international plane (be it a subject-matter
under s 91 and/or s 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867). This is the applicable
positive law, the constitutional law in this country and, unless it is changed
by constitutional amendments, the mythical reality associated to Quebec
former Minister of Education Paul G6rin-Lajoie will remain just that: a
myth.

